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11 
BILLY JOEL: THE MINSTREL TESTIFIES OR HOW THE 
RULES OF EVIDENCE HANDCUFF THE PIANO MAN 
Hon. Richard A. Dollinger* 
It’s 9 o’clock on the Monday 
The students they all stumble in 
They’re bleary eyed and all out of sorts 
From the reading their Prosser on Torts. 
One says “can you sing me a Joel song 
Billy never goes wrong 
He’s lyrical too and always makes sense 
Even under the Rules of Evidence”1 
 
Billy Joel is one of America’s poets.  He has through a caval-
cade of songs, worked magic in the hearts of millions.  His lyrics cap-
ture the thoughts of a modern Romeo, seeking the maiden who can 
subdue his passionate heart.  Billy Joel songs are about “courting” – 
the pulsating rituals of boy-meets-girl, girl-spurns-boy – and “wit-
nessing” – the hard-working man struggling for his family and 
friends.  But, even poets have a day of reckoning: a day when their 
sublime world of rhythm and rhyme must be reconciled with the oth-
er courts: the courts of law. 
Before we tinkle the ivories of Mr. Joel’s songs, a word about 
hearsay.  Hearsay, under both federal and state law, is an out-of-court 
statement offered in court for its truthfulness.2  Because it is often 
considered inherently unreliable, hearsay – one person’s rendition of 
what another person said as being the truth of the thing asserted – is 
never admitted before a court unless an exception exists under the 
 
* Acting Supreme Court Justice, New York Court of Claims. 
1 Billy Joel Goes to Law School (author’s composition), borrowed from BILLY JOEL, The 
Piano Man, on PIANO MAN (Columbia Records 1973). 
2 See FED. R. EVID. 801(c) “‘Hearsay’ means a statement that: (1) the declarant does not 
make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” Id. 
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rules of evidence.3  An out-of-court statement offered for a reason 
other than its truth is not hearsay, and consequently, its admission is 
not barred.4  New York courts apply the same rule through common 
law.5  Billy Joel’s songs, if sung in a courtroom, may all be some 
form of hearsay; but for this article, a reader needs to engage in a 
“willing suspension of disbelief for the moment, which constitutes 
poetic faith,”6 as Mr. Joel’s songs are examined as though they were 
proof offered in a courtroom and the rules of evidence, applicable to 
attorneys for centuries, are applied to this hipster. 
To paraphrase Mark Antony: “So let it be with [Joel].”7  
When the minstrel comes into our courtrooms, the lines on the page 
and the notes on the scale become subjected to our ancient rules re-
garding the admissibility of evidence.  Like the ancient scores and 
operatic flourishes utilized by the modern songwriter, the rules of ev-
idence, long sharpened by common law judges seeking the truth, im-
pose a rubric of rules designed to summon truth from the human ex-
perience.8  The rules of evidence are the conventions of law – the 
blank sheets of music – in which witnesses, in all their frailty, and 
truth, collide. 
I. COULD BILLY JOEL GET INTO THE COURTROOM AND PLAY 
HIS PIANO? 
What would happen if the poet laureate of Long Island wan-
dered into our courtrooms, brought his piano into the well and started 
to play? 
The first issue would be whether he could bring the piano into 
the courtroom at all.  The piano is a piece of real evidence and, pre-
sumably, Mr. Joel would need to establish a proper evidentiary foun-
dation for allowing the jury to observe Mr. Joel play the piano.9  He 
 
3 State v. Floyd, 2 N.E.3d 204 (N.Y. 2013). 
4 See FED. R. EVID. 802.  See also United States v. Arbolaez, 450 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th 
Cir. 2006) (per curiam). 
5 See, e.g., People v. Rosario, 958 N.E.2d 93, 104 (N.Y. 2011) (Smith, J., dissenting) “In 
general, the hearsay rule prohibits the admission into evidence of out-of-court statements to 
prove the truth of the matter stated.” Id. 
6 SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE, BIOGRAPHIA LITERARIA ch. 14 (1834). 
7 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR, act 3, sc. 2. 
8 FED. R. EVID. 102. 
9 Cach, LLC v. NE Enters., LLC, 993 N.Y.S.2d 643, 43 Misc. 3d 1232(A) at *1-2 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Seneca County 2014). 
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would need personal knowledge of the piano and its operation.10  As 
a witness, Mr. Joel would need to be able to state that he was “famil-
iar” with the piano.11  The ultimate question - whether the real evi-
dence in the form of piano is relevant or helpful to the jury - might 
require more proof.12 
The second issue would be whether Mr. Joel’s playing of the 
piano is a form of demonstrative evidence that would be admissible 
in a courtroom.  Demonstrative evidence (or real evidence) is defined 
as, “evidence addressed directly to the senses of the trier of the 
facts.”13  In Harvey v. Mazal American Partners,14 the Court of Ap-
peals noted that: 
[D]emonstrative evidence, when “validly and carefully 
used,” is highly convincing . . . “[T]hough tests and 
demonstrations in the courtroom are not lightly to be 
rejected when they would play a positive and helpful 
role in the ascertainment of truth, courts must be alert 
to the danger that, when ill-designed or not properly 
relevant to the point at issue, instead of being helpful 
they may serve but to mislead, confuse, divert or oth-
erwise prejudice the purposes of the trial . . . .  When 
there is such a threat, the trial court itself must decide 
in the exercise of a sound discretion based on the na-
ture of the proffered proof and the context in which it 
is offered, whether the value of the evidence out-
weighs its potential for prejudice.”15 
Under these circumstances, the New York courts are reluctant to al-
low “demonstrations” in any trials, and that judicial reluctance may 
be heightened if the “demonstration” involves a musical instrument. 
However, there was at least one exception in which a New 
York court allowed a musical performance in the courtroom.  In Rid-
dle v. Memorial Hospital,16 an accomplished violinist fell in a hospi-
 
10 Id. at *1. 
11 See Stark v. Gopinathan, 2015 WL 7070064, at *6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015) (discussing the 
need for an expert to be familiar with objects relevant to the disputed issues). 
12 See People v. Young, 850 N.E.2d 623 (N.Y. 2006). 
13 People v. Higgins, 392 N.Y.S.2d 800, 801 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1977) (citing 
RICHARDSON, EVIDENCE § 127 (10th ed. 1973). 
14 590 N.E.2d 224 (N.Y. 1992). 
15 Id. at 227 (quoting People v. Acevedo, 358 N.E.2d 495 (N.Y. 1976)). 
16 349 N.Y.S.2d 855 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1973). 
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tal.17  As a result of the fall, she complained that her ability to use her 
forearm and play the violin was “substantially impaired.”18  During 
the trial, the court allowed an expert witness to play the violin as a 
demonstration of the ability of injured plaintiff to play the violin.19  
The Appellate Division held that the issue of whether the demonstra-
tive evidence could be heard by the jury was dependent upon the 
“relevancy and value of such evidence” for the jury.20  The expert tes-
tified that he heard a tape of the injured plaintiff perform before the 
injury and then testified that he observed the difficulties the plaintiff 
endured “as she played and explained how it was impossible to exe-
cute certain technical movements without full use of the left arm.”21  
The Appellate Division held: 
[W]e find no abuse of discretion on the part of the Tri-
al Judge, and no prejudice by any implication to be 
drawn from the demonstration to the effect that [the 
plaintiff] could perform at a certain degree of profi-
ciency, because there had been ample evidence from 
the other witnesses as to her skill and proficiency as 
well as proper instructions to the jury from the court.  
Certainly, the demonstration was not sensational or 
calculated to disrupt the “calm judicial atmosphere of 
a court of justice” nor did it tend to confuse the issues 
of the case.22 
But not all demonstrations by witnesses are allowed: the courts have 
a sense of decorum.  A witness who sought to demonstrate an injury 
in an automobile crash was not allowed to demonstrate his shaky 
hands while trying to pour a drink.23  More recently, in Schou v. 
Whiteley,24 the plaintiff had a scar from a lumbar fusion that he want-
 
17 Id. at 857. 
18 Id. at 858. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Riddle, 349 N.Y.S.2d at 858. 
22 Id. at 855 (citation omitted). 
23 Clark v. Brooklyn Heights R.R., 69 N.E. 647, 647 (N.Y. 1904).  The decision noted that 
“[w]hen, however, proof is attempted to be made by allowing the plaintiff to act out upon a 
judicial stage before the jurors what he, or his physicians, have testified to be some nervous 
affection, resulting from an injury, the exhibition is improper because unfair.  As something 
under the sole control of the witness himself, it is beyond the ordinary tests of examination.” 
Id. 
24 780 N.Y.S.2d 659 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2004). 
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ed to show the jury, a move that would have required him to remove 
his pants.25  The Appellate Division affirmed that “the-take-off-your-
pants” demonstration was, properly, not permitted by the trial court in 
the exercise of its discretion.26 
In sum, Billy Joel could likely play the piano in the New York 
courts for demonstrative purposes, under certain circumstances.  
However, any flourishes, excessive celebration, over-the-top whoop-
dee doops - “hello, Central Islipians” shout-outs - or exposing of his 
buttocks might be ruled out of order or, at least, would require a more 
powerful precautionary instruction to the jury. 
II. COULD MR. JOEL TESTIFY ABOUT “THE UPTOWN GIRL?” 
In his song Uptown Girl, Joel spins a yarn about the fictional 
girl who eagerly awaits his earthy urban charm.  In it, he chants: 
She’s been living in her uptown world 
I bet she never had a backstreet guy 
I bet her mama never told her why 
I’m gonna try for an uptown girl 
She’s been living in her white bread world 
As long as anyone with hot blood can 
And now she’s looking for a downtown man 
That’s what I am27 
However, when he comes into court, his chant may encounter 
an attorney’s favorite courtroom word: “objection.”  Initially, the 
court would inquire as to whether these statements are based on ob-
servation.  A witness can testify, based on first-hand knowledge, of 
where someone else resided.28  However, the characterization of the 
“uptown world” and the description of the songster as a “backstreet 
guy” are statements of opinion.  Initially, the question for a court 
considering these statements would be whether they are admissible 
opinions offered by a lay witness.  There are two theories regarding 
the admissibility of these types of statements.  Under Rule 701 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, “if the witness is not testifying as an ex-
pert, his testimony in the form of opinions is limited to one that is (a) 
 
25 Id. at 662. 
26 Id. 
27 BILLY JOEL, Uptown Girl, on An INNOCENT MAN (Columbia Records 1983). 
28 United States ex rel. Allen v. La Vallee, 411 F.2d 241, 242 (2d Cir. 1969). 
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rationally based on the witness’s perception” and “(b) helpful to a 
clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in 
issue.”29  In Randolph v. Collectramatic Inc.,30 the court reasoned that 
“[t]he primary purpose of Rule 701 is to allow nonexpert witnesses to 
give opinion testimony when, as a matter of practical necessity, 
events which they have personally observed cannot otherwise be ful-
ly presented to the court or the jury.”31  The New York Court of Ap-
peals follows the same rule.32  For example, “a lay witness is ordinar-
ily permitted to testify as to the estimated speed of an automobile 
based upon the prevalence of automobiles in society and the frequen-
cy with which most people view them at various speeds.”33  In short, 
if most people know a fact – where uptown begins and downtown 
ends, for example – then a lay witness can testify to it.34 
Under these rules, it is debatable whether a court would per-
mit anyone other than an expert to characterize a young girl as “an 
uptown girl.”  Similarly, the courts may be unlikely to allow anyone, 
even an experienced “Long Islander,” to state that he “bet she never 
had a backstreet guy.”  The New York courts have frowned upon 
speculation as to another person’s state of mind.35  In some cases, ev-
idence may be admissible, if not “offered for the purpose of establish-
ing the truth thereof, but merely to establish the defendant’s state of 
mind.”36  However, in this case, the songster’s declaration regarding 
the “Uptown Girl” and “his bet” that “she’s never had a backstreet 
guy” is not evidence of his state of mind: he is speculating as to her 
state of mind and thus, his statement is inadmissible. 
However, the following statement in the song – “a downtown 
man, that’s what I am” – may be admissible under the “state of mind” 
exception to the hearsay rule.  The rule is simply stated: 
No testimonial effect need be given to the declaration, 
 
29 FED. R. EVID. 701 (a)-(b). 
30 590 F.2d 844 (10th Cir. 1979). 
31 Id. at 846 (citing WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE ¶ 701(02) (1977)). 
32 Ferguson v. Hubble, 97 N.Y. 507, 512-14 (1884). 
33 Lynch v. Dobler Chevrolet, Inc., 855 N.Y.S.2d 172, 172 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2008). 
34 See FED. R. EVID. 701 (a)-(c). 
35 See, e.g., People v. Walker, 475 N.E.2d 445, 446 (N.Y. 1984) (holding that where there 
was insufficient evidence to establish the defendant’s “extreme emotional disturbance,” 
charging the jury with that defense “would have invited the jury to impermissibly speculate 
as to the defendant's state of mind at the time of the shooting”). 
36 People v. Barr, 874 N.Y.S.2d 384, 384 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2009) (quoting People v. 
Boyd, 683 N.Y.S.2d 271, 272 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1998)). 
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but the fact that such a declaration was made by the 
[declarant], whether true or false, is compelling evi-
dence of her feelings toward, and relations to, [the 
proponent].  As such it is not excluded under the hear-
say rule but is admissible as a verbal act.37 
In this instance, the declarant is making a statement indicative of his 
state of mind.  If relevant to any issue before the court, this statement 
should be admissible. 
One other statement in Uptown Girl could find its way into 
the trial transcript.  In his description of this girl, the songster states: 
And when she’s walking 
She’s looking so fine.38 
This statement, albeit refined and impressionistic, is a present sense 
impression that should be admitted.  In analogous context, a witness 
was allowed to describe a spring day as “beautiful.”39  If a witness 
can describe a day as “beautiful,” then Mr. Joel can describe his “Up-
town Girl” as “looking so fine.” 
III. WHO STARTED THE “FIRE” IF MR. JOEL DID NOT?  
NEGATIVE HEARSAY 
In his rhythmic celebration of all things relevant to the 20th 
Century - We Didn’t Start the Fire40 - Mr. Joel creates a time-
travelogue through the most renowned century since men started 
walking erect.  In the song, he corrals Edsel automobiles, British poli-
tician sex, and Bridge on the River Kwai - all that’s missing is the 
Colonel Bogey March - and the potpourri of personalities and places 
of our shared time.  At its core, he declares: 
We didn’t start the fire 
It was always burning 
Since the world’s been turning 
We didn’t start the fire 
No we didn’t light it 
But we tried to fight it.41 
 
37 Loetsch v. New York City Omnibus Corp., 52 N.E.2d 448, 449 (N.Y. 1943). 
38 BILLY JOEL, Uptown Girl, on An INNOCENT MAN (Columbia Records 1983). 
39 Rubino v. New York, 498 N.Y.S.2d 831, 832 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1986). 
40 BILLY JOEL, We Didn’t Start the Fire, on STORM FRONT (Columbia Records 1989). 
41 Id. 
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If he tried to deny, “starting” that fire, would a court of law allow his 
denial to be admitted?  Could a court find that the other personages - 
Walter Winchell, Malcolm X, Buddy Holly, among others - named 
by Mr. Joel actually started the fire?  The answer lies in a discussion 
about “negative evidence,” or its corollary, “negative hearsay.”  The 
doctrine finds its best demonstration in the “unrung bell” example in 
Leary v. Fitchburg R.R.  The court in Leary noted: 
There was a failure of proof by the plaintiff that the 
passenger train was not giving proper precautionary 
signals of its approach.  There was but one witness on 
this question.  To him the following question was put: 
“You may state whether the passenger engine bell was 
ringing at that time.”  He answered: “No, sir; I didn’t 
hear it.”  On his cross-examination he said: “I didn’t 
hear any bell.  I wasn’t listening.  I wasn’t anticipating 
anything.  I didn’t listen for a bell.”  This mere nega-
tive evidence is without any value.42 
As this court noted, you cannot prove a “positive” – the bell did not 
ring – by proof of a “negative” – the fact that it was not heard.  In this 
song, the artist’s relying on a “negative” – while lyrically energizing 
Mr. Joel’s song – gives a jury no proof of “who stared the fire.”  The 
songster’s statement is somewhat comparable to the testimony of a 
record keeper, who testifies to a lack of entries in certain records and 
seeks to have the fact-finder conclude that such a record does not - 
and never did - exist.43  The New York Civil Procedure Law and 
Regulations, (CPLR) provides for the admissibility and prima facie 
effect of a limited type of negative hearsay.44  As one court noted: 
A statement signed by the custodian of public records 
“that he has made diligent search of the records and 
found no record or entry of a specified nature, is prima 
facie evidence that the records contain no such record 
or entry,” if the statement is accompanied by a certifi-
cate as to the signatory’s legal custody of the rec-
 
42 Leary v. Fitchburg R. R., 65 N.Y.S. 699, 702 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1900).  
43 Whitfield v. City of New York, 847 N.Y.S.2d 899, 16 Misc.3d 1115(A), at *1 (Sup. Ct. 
Kings County 2007) (explaining that negative hearsay is a statement “as to the absence of a 
business record or entry in establishing the nonexistence or nonoccurrence of a fact or event 
not recorded.”). 
44 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4521 (McKinney 2013). 
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ords.45 
The New York courts have dealt with negative hearsay in oth-
er contexts.  Statements of the absence of a business record as estab-
lishing the nonexistence or nonoccurrence of a fact or event not rec-
orded are regularly proffered by an affidavit on a motion for 
summary judgment in sidewalk and roadway accident cases.46  In 
Whitfield v. City of New York, Justice Battaglia stated, “[t]he eviden-
tiary value of ‘negative hearsay’ in New York State courts is clouded 
by a divergence between what the courts say, or at least have said in 
the past, and what they do, at least now.”47  The court noted that there 
is no provision in the CPLR addressing whether an “unsuccessful 
search for a record or entry in the business records of a private party” 
leads to the conclusion that the record or entry did not exist.48  Until 
recently, the law in New York was understood to be that “[s]uch evi-
dence, completely negative, has uniformly been held to be hearsay in 
character and incompetent and irrelevant.”49  Nonetheless, the Whit-
field court considered the negative hearsay - the absence of proof in 
the record - as sufficient to oppose a motion for summary judgment, 
noting: 
To sum up, the only New York decisional authority 
that expressly addresses whether the absence of a 
business record or entry can be evidence of the nonex-
istence or nonoccurrence of a fact or event not record-
ed states clearly that it cannot, but more recent au-
thority accepts the evidence in particular 
circumstances, sometimes with qualification, without 
even noting the doctrinal statements that would pre-
clude it.  It does seem clear, however, that, to the ex-
tent “negative hearsay” is accepted in New York out-
side of the public records context, it is treated within 
the construct of the business records exception to the 
hearsay rule.50 
The court added that more recent authorities have held that “a litigant 
 
45 Whitfield, 847 N.Y.S.2d at *2 (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4521). 
46 Id. at *4. 
47 Id. at *1. 
48 Id. at *2. 
49 Id. at *2. 
50 Whitfield, 847 N.Y.S.2d at *4. 
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may prove through negative inference . . . the non-occurrence of an 
event or transaction from the absence of an entry in a business’s rec-
ords where such records normally contain like information.”51  Nega-
tive hearsay, once thought extinct in New York, may have new life. 
The Federal Rules of Evidence are a step ahead of New York 
in dealing with negative hearsay.  Federal Rule 803(10) excludes evi-
dence of the absence of a public record or an entry in a public record 
from the hearsay rule.  It provides: 
To prove the absence of a record, report, statement, or 
data compilation, in any form, or the nonoccurrence or 
nonexistence of a matter of which a record, report, 
statement, or data compilation, in any form, was regu-
larly made and preserved by a public office or agency, 
evidence in the form of a certification in accordance 
with rule 902, or testimony, that diligent search failed 
to disclose the record, report, statement, or data com-
pilation, or entry.52 
This rule relies on the dependability of public records and the 
due diligence of record keepers and simply leads to an inference that 
a document, which would be otherwise filed, may not exist.  Mr. Joel 
may be a record maker, sell oodles of records and generate concert 
attendance records, but he hardly qualifies as a record keeper in the 
sense of the rules.  Simply put, Mr. Joel’s denial that “we didn’t start 
the fire” raises a suggestion that someone else did.  He does not dis-
close whom the “we” is, but adds that whoever it is, they “tried to 
fight it.”  Given the nature of this song, any reasonable court might 
find it difficult to countenance Mr. Joel’s negative disclaimer.  In any 
reasonable rendition of this song, he brings a lot of “fire” to it.  If he 
did not start the fire, this song - in its gusto, all-out, “fan-the-flames” 
rendition - only accelerates its burning.  A jury - or an audience - en-
countering this form of negative hearsay would have a hard time be-
lieving that Mr. Joel did not start the fire. 
 
51 Id. at *5. 
52 FED. R. EVID. 803(10).  See also Cameron v. Camden Military Acad., No. 3:12-846-
JFA, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81594, at *8 (D.S.C. June 11, 2013) (holding that the testimony 
by former cadets that they “never heard of” anyone being hazed or mistreated at CMA would 
not be inadmissible inasmuch as it was negative hearsay). 
10
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IV. SCENES FROM AN ITALIAN RESTAURANT – A PAST 
RECOLLECTION RECORDED? 
In his romantic remembrance of a rendezvous at “our Italian 
restaurant,” Mr. Joel sings of an old romance, a time gone by.  The 
narrator intones: 
Everyone said they were crazy 
“Brenda you know you’re much too lazy 
Eddie could never afford to live that kind of life.” 
But there we were wavin’ Brenda and Eddie good-
bye.53 
If Mr. Joel offered this line in court and counsel objected, the court 
might face the question of whether it should be admitted under the 
past recollection recorded exception to the rule against hearsay.  This 
doctrine has a long history of acceptance in New York.  In 1858, the 
Court of Appeals held that a written memorandum made at or about 
the time of the occurrence, by a witness who cannot at the time of tri-
al recollect the facts, but who testifies that he or she is confident that 
he or she knew the memorandum to be correct when it was made, 
need not be sworn to the facts in positive terms.54  Instead, the memo-
randum itself is received in connection with and as auxiliary to the 
oral testimony.55  To be admitted, “the witness must swear that he or 
she ‘has no present recollection whatever of the facts sworn to.’”56  In 
addition, the witness must testify that he or she “observed the matter 
recorded, the recollection was fairly fresh when recorded or adopted, 
. . . [and] that the record correctly represent[s] his [or her] knowledge 
and recollection when made.”57  Importantly, the recollection by the 
witness must be characterized as “fairly fresh.”58 
“The rationale for the doctrine is that the recorded infor-
 
53 BILLY JOEL, Scenes from an Italian Restaurant, on THE STRANGER (Columbia Records 
1977). 
54 Russell v Hudson River R. R., 17 N.Y. 134, 140 (1858). 
55 Id. 
56 People v. Somarriba, 597 N.Y.S.2d 32, 33 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1993) (quoting Russell, 
17 N.Y. at 139-40). 
57 People v. Taylor, 598 N.E.2d 693, 696 (N.Y. 1992). 
58 See People v. DiTommaso, 2 N.Y.S.3d 494, 498 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2015) (holding 
that a six-year gap between the events and the recording of the recollection prevented the use 
of such recording); People v. Wilkinson, 990 N.Y.S.2d 270, 272 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2014) 
(holding that a one-year gap between when the witness heard the statement and when it was 
recorded before a grand jury prevented the use of the past recollection recorded). 
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mation is essential to further the truth-seeking function of the trial 
proceeding and that when the conditions for admission have been 
met, there is sufficient assurance of the accuracy of the recordation 
and its trustworthiness.”59  More than a century ago, the Court of Ap-
peals recognized the probative value of such recordings by stating 
that “[t]o exclude such a record, when shown to have been honestly 
made, would be to reject the best and frequently the only means of 
arriving at truth.”60  Importantly, the recording, if admitted, “is not 
independent evidence of the facts contained therein, but is supple-
mentary to the testimony of the witness.”61  Likewise, “[t]he witness’ 
testimony and the writing’s contents are to be taken together and 
treated in combination as if the witness had testified to the contents of 
the writing based on present knowledge.”62  As always, “[a]dmission 
of the memorandum is a matter . . . of the court’s discretion in deter-
mining whether the proponent has made a sufficient showing of the 
accuracy of the recording and its reliability.”63 
In this case, the entire story rendered in Scenes from an Ital-
ian Restaurant, including the statement about Brenda and Eddie, may 
be admissible in court.  This may be the case if Mr. Joel could 
demonstrate that the “recording” - the song - was written or recorded 
in the past; that it was accurate at the time written; that the “record-
ing” occurred somewhat contemporaneously with the actual event; 
and that at the time of trial, Mr. Joel had no present recollection of 
the event.  The song would also have to meet the “fairly fresh” re-
quirement, meaning that it was penned – but not necessarily recorded 
– shortly after it occurred.  In all likelihood, under the past recollec-
tion recorded exception, a jury might be permitted to hear the entire 
story of Brenda and Eddie and the “bottle of red, bottle of white” im-
bibed at Mr. Joel’s favorite Italian restaurant. 
V. PIANO MAN – SPONTANEOUS DECLARATIONS, STATE OF 
MIND, AND STATEMENT OF PRESENT INTENTION 
In the tour of the barroom in the song Piano Man,64 Mr. Joel 
 
59 People v. Taylor, 598 N.E.2d 693, 696 (N.Y. 1992). 
60 Halsey v. Sinsebaugh, 15 N.Y. 485, 488 (1857). 
61 Taylor, 598 N.E.2d at 696. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 BILLY JOEL, Piano Man, on PIANO MAN (Columbia Records 1973). 
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captures the cries and shouts of the bar regulars as they slosh and 
nosh through the night.  One patron shouts: “‘Son can you play me a 
memory/ I’m not really sure how it goes/ But it’s sad and it’s sweet/ 
And I knew it complete/ When I wore a younger man’s clothes.’”65  
John, his friend at the bar, says to him, “‘Bill, I believe this killing 
me/ . . . Well, I’m sure that I could be a movie star/ If I could get out 
this place.’”66  Apparently, the “pretty good crowd for a Saturday” - 
“sit at the bar and put bread in [his] jar/ And say, ‘Man, what are you 
doing here?’”67  If he sauntered into the courtroom as a witness to the 
events at the bar, the issue would be whether Mr. Joel could testify to 
the comments made by his barroom buddies. 
In the first statement - “Son can you play me a memory” - lies 
the heart of the hearsay rule.  An out-of-court statement may be ad-
mitted in a trial as evidence of a party’s reaction to the statement.68  
In the highly publicized New York Court of Appeals case, People v. 
Harris,69 the court held that a threatening hearsay statement could be 
admitted in a murder trial for the limited purpose of providing con-
text as to defendant’s reaction to the statement.70  Six months before 
disappearing, the victim in Harris told two family members that her 
husband - the defendant - said that he “would not need a gun to kill 
her, the police would never find her body and he would never be ar-
rested.”71  At trial, the defendant denied making the statements, but 
the family members testified that when confronted with the state-
ments, the defendant replied that “he may have said something like 
that but that did not mean that he was going to kill [his wife].”72  The 
trial court admitted the statements,73 but gave only a cursory limiting 
instruction and declined a more detailed version because it would 
 
65 Id. 
66 Id.  This refrain may have been borrowed from a song by the Animals, We Gotta Get 
out of this Place, written by Barry Mann and Cynthia Weil (MGM 1965). 
67 Id. 
68 People v. James, 717 N.E.2d 1052, 1055 (N.Y. 1999). 
69 978 N.E.2d 1246 (N.Y. 2012). 
70 Id. at 1250. 
71 Id. at 1248. 
72 Id. at n.2. 
73 These statements could also be considered statements by a party opponent, which al-
most always are admissible. See Grucci v. Grucci, 981 N.E.2d 248, 251 (N.Y. 2012).  The 
rationale for admitting such statements is that an extrajudicial statement by a party opponent, 
inconsistent with the party's position in the litigation, is presumptively reliable. See Reed v. 
McCord, 54 N.E. 737, 740 (N.Y. 1899) (reasoning that “it is highly improbable that a party 
will admit or state anything against himself or against his own interest unless it is true.”). 
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“unnecessarily confuse the jury.”74  However, as a demonstration of 
the limitations and prejudicial dangers inherent in hearsay, the Court 
of Appeals held that the trial court’s failure to give a detailed limiting 
instruction was improper.75  The court highlighted the danger of al-
lowing a jury to hear any hearsay comments: 
[The trial court] opted instead to charge the jury that 
the statements constituted hearsay which would not 
normally be allowed in evidence because its truthful-
ness could not be tested under oath, and then stated: 
“You, the jury, may consider that testimony regarding 
this episode and determine what evidentiary value, if 
any, you choose to assign to the exchange that oc-
curred between [the victim’s family members] and . . . 
[the defendant].” 
The trial court’s failure to issue the appropriate limit-
ing instruction was not harmless.  In a case where 
there was no body or weapon, and the evidence 
against defendant was purely circumstantial, the dan-
ger that the jury accepted [the victim’s] statements for 
truth was real.  Although the court’s instruction ex-
plained why the statements were admitted in evidence, 
it failed to apprise the jury that the statements were not 
to be considered for their truth.  This error was com-
pounded when the prosecutor in his summation relied 
on those statements as direct evidence that defendant 
had, in fact, murdered [the victim] and successfully 
hid her body, as he purportedly threatened [the victim] 
that he would do.76 
What makes this case an example of the vagaries of the hearsay rule 
is evident when comparing the Court of Appeals decision to the Ap-
pellate Division decision on the same point.  The Appellate Division 
held that the statement was properly admitted and that the trial 
court’s limited precautionary instruction was sufficient to eliminate 
any prejudice: 
[T]he victim’s statements were recounted by [the sis-
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ters-in-law] to clarify the substance of the threats that 
defendant acknowledged making when they confront-
ed him.  Moreover, while the court did not explicitly 
instruct the jury that the statements were not admitted 
for their truth, the court explained that the victim’s 
statements would normally be considered inadmissible 
hearsay, but the witnesses “were permitted to refer to 
those alleged statements for the sole purpose of ex-
plaining that they confronted [defendant] with those 
statements at the Cooperstown dinner.  And they were 
then permitted to describe [defendant’s] reaction to 
those statements.”  The instruction was sufficient to 
direct the jury that the statements should be considered 
only for their non-hearsay purpose, i.e., as context for 
the confrontation between defendant and his sisters-in-
law. (Citations omitted).  To the extent that the dis-
sent77 takes issue with the People referring to those 
statements in their summation, we note that [the sis-
ters-in-law] testified that defendant admitted making 
the statements.  The People were permitted and enti-
tled to refer to that admission for its truthfulness, as 
well as the materially indistinguishable threat over-
head by [the hairdresser], which was admitted for its 
truth.78 
Under these rules, the “Old Man’s” comment may come in as some 
evidence of his disposition. 
 The other option to admit the “Old Man’s” comment might be as 
an excited utterance, another exception to the hearsay rule.  The rule 
is stated as follows by the Court of Appeals: 
 
77 People v. Harris, 928 N.Y.S.2d 114, 120-22, 133 (3d Dep’t 2011) (One of the Appel-
late Division judges dissented.). 
78 Id. at 120-22, rev’d, 978 N.E.2d 1246 (2012).  An important exception to the hearsay 
rule is found in the testimony of another witness in the case. Harris, 928 N.Y.S.2d at 120-22.  
A hairdresser testified regarding a telephone conversation that the victim had with defendant 
during her last salon appointment in July 2001. Id.  The victim tipped her cell phone so the 
hairdresser could hear defendant, who told the victim: “Drop the divorce proceedings.  I will 
f … ing kill you, Michele.  Do you hear me?  I will f … ing kill you.  I can make you disap-
pear.  F … you, you bitch.  Drop the divorce proceedings.” Id.; see also Harris, 928 
N.Y.S.2d at 120. (The hairdresser’s testimony can be admitted for its truthfulness as a state-
ment by a party opponent.  But, it also gives credence to an old Clairol adage: “[o]nly her 
hairdresser knows for sure.”  In this author’s experience, anything told to a hairdresser is al-
ways true sometimes.). 
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The familiar common-law hearsay exception for excit-
ed utterances, formerly called spontaneous declara-
tions, has been recognized by the New York Court of 
Appeals for nearly a century.  The principle is easily 
stated.  An out-of-court statement is properly admissi-
ble under the excited utterance exception when made 
under the stress of excitement caused by an external 
event, and not the product of studied reflection and 
possible fabrication.  Underlying this exception is the 
assumption that a person under the influence of the 
excitement precipitated by an external startling event 
will lack the reflective capacity essential for fabrica-
tion and, accordingly, any utterance he makes will be 
spontaneous and trustworthy.  Accordingly, under cer-
tain circumstances of physical shock, a stress of nerv-
ous excitement may be produced which stills the re-
flective faculties and removes their control.  An 
excited utterance is made under the immediate and un-
controlled domination of the senses, and during the 
brief period when considerations of self-interest could 
not have been brought fully to bear by reasoned reflec-
tion.79 
The court further held that: 
Stating the rule is simple.  Determining a declarant’s 
mental state—that is, whether at the time the utterance 
was made a declarant was in fact under the stress of 
excitement caused by an external event sufficient to 
still his or her reflective faculties is considerably more 
difficult.80 
 
79 People v. Johnson, 804 N.E.2d 402, 405-6 (N.Y. 2003). 
80 Id. at 405.  The Court of Appeals acknowledged, in a footnote: 
Regrettably, there is no simple, sure-fire test such as that once proposed 
by the late Irving Younger: “How do you recognize an excited utter-
ance?  I can tell you.  If hearsay is offered and it begins with ‘My God,’ 
and ends with an exclamation point, it is an excited utterance" (Younger, 
An Irreverent Introduction to Hearsay, at 33 [ABA Section of Litig 
Monograph Series No. 3, 1977]).  Neither exclamation nor punctuation 
can be determinative.  Rather, courts must take into account that a varie-
ty of circumstances may determine whether a declarant remains under 
the stress of a startling event.  
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The Old Man’s comment may qualify as an “excited utterance.”  The 
Court of Appeals said that a court, in deciding whether to admit such 
a statement may consider that the declarant is “under the influence of 
excitement precipitated by an external startling event.”81  The Old 
Man in this story is clearly “under the influence” and no doubt, Bill 
Joel’s emergence in the bar room could be considered “an external 
startling event.”  Given the Old Man’s “love affair with his tonic and 
gin,”82 it is likely that when shouting to the Piano Man, his “consid-
erations of self-interest could not have been brought fully to bear by 
reasoned reflection.”83  Under these circumstances, his entire com-
ment –slurred from atop his bar stool– may qualify as an “excited ut-
terance” exception to the hearsay rule. 
When these rules are applied to “Old Man” in the first stanza 
of the “Piano Man,”84 the remark, as relayed by the Piano Man, may 
also be admissible as part of the state of mind.  A state of mind, if 
relevant, may be proved by contemporaneous declarations of feeling 
or intent.85  The “state of mind” rule is discussed extensively by the 
Court of Appeals in People v. James.86  In James, the court exam-
ined, at some length, the Supreme Court decision in Mutual Life Ins. 
Co. v. Hillmon.87  The James court stated: 
Jurisdiction after jurisdiction of State and Federal 
courts have determined to follow the lead of Hillmon 
and Hunter in admitting against criminal defendants 
(upon establishment of an appropriate foundation) the 
statements of a declarant’s intention to perform acts 
entailing the participation jointly or cooperatively of 
the non-declarant accused.  We also adopt that rule.88 
Apart from Hillmon, the New York courts have admitted declarations 




82 BILLY JOEL, Piano Man, on PIANO MAN (Columbia Records 1973). 
83 People v. Fratello, 706 N.E.2d 1173, 1175 (N.Y. 1998). 
84 BILLY JOEL, Piano Man, on PIANO MAN (Columbia Records 1973). 
85 Mutual Life Ins., Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285, 295 (1892). 
86 717 N.E.2d 1052 (N.Y. 1990). 
87 145 U.S. 285 (1892).  The impact of Hillmon on hearsay rules, generally, is worth an 
extended discussion.  The Court of Appeals in People v. James, 717 N.E.2d 1052 (N.Y. 
1990), dissected it at length and the Hillmon opinion is worth the read just for that analysis. 
88 James, 717 N.E.2d at 1058-59. 
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symptoms.89  Whether the “Old Man” is suffering may be the subject 
of debate: he is, after all, “making love to his tonic and gin.”90  But, 
in all likelihood, the statement by the “Old Man,” relayed through the 
Piano Man, is admitted. 
John the bartender’s statement, “Bill, I believe this is killing 
me.”  “Well, I’m sure I could be a movie star, if I could get out this 
place”91 - would also be admissible under another exception to the 
hearsay rule: a statement of present intention.  In People v. Becoats,92 
a witness attempted to testify that she heard another person say that 
he was going to kill another.93  The trial court excluded the testimo-
ny.94  The Court of Appeals, while finding other grounds for the ad-
mission, nonetheless considered the statement within the “present in-
tention” exception to the hearsay rule.95  John’s present intention –
head to Hollywood if he could get out the bar– would be admissible 
under that exception. 
The final quoted line in the song –“Man, what are you doin’ 
here?”96– is simply not hearsay.  The statement would not be admis-
sible for its truthfulness, but simply for the fact that it was said.97  In 
the alternative, the phrase might qualify as a “spontaneous declara-
tion,” uttered by several lost souls in the bar.  The New York courts 
have admitted other spontaneous declarations over a hearsay objec-
tion, like the defendant who told his mother in an interrogation room: 
“he wants to know why I shot him.”98 
 
89 Jiminian v. St. Barnabas Hosp., 923 N.Y.S.2d 323, 648 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2011). 
90 BILLY JOEL, Piano Man, on PIANO MAN (Columbia Records 1973). 
91 Id. 
92 958 N.E.2d 865 (N.Y. 2011). 
93 Id. at 871. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 BILLY JOEL, Piano Man, on PIANO MAN (Columbia Records 1973). 
97 People v. Caban, 833 N.E.2d 213, 217 (N.Y. 2005); People v. Ozuna, 811 N.Y.S.2d 
646, 649 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2006).  It should be noted that “[C]omplainant's out-of-court 
statement (“Tell your son to call me”) would appear to be a “verbal act” that is admissible 
merely because it was said.” Id. 
98 People v. Perino, 19 N.Y.3d 85 (2012) contra Brown v. Simon, 123 A.D.3d 1120 (App. 
Div. 2d Dep’t 2014).  A statement that another child “did it” was not a spontaneous declara-
tion admissible in a sexual abuse hearing. Id. 
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VI. THE NEW YORK STATE OF MIND - IS IT AN EXCEPTION TO 
THE HEARSAY RULE AND IS MR. JOEL AN EXPERT ON THE 
ISSUE UNDER THE FRYE DOCTRINE? 
In one of his earliest hits –New York State of Mind– Mr. Joel 
gives his listeners a nostalgic tour of the Big Apple.99  It is redolent 
with memories of the young rocker taking stock of the Big City, “tak-
ing a Greyhound on the Hudson River Line . . . in a New York State 
of Mind.”100  He mentions the New York Times and the Daily News, 
Chinatown and Riverside and adds that it “all comes to reality . . . 
and I don’t have any reasons, I’ve left them all behind in a New York 
State of Mind.”101  As conceded earlier, any hearer can testify to 
words proffered by another if they reflect his or her state of mind un-
der the state of mind exception.  But, can Mr. Joel testify on this 
point if he is testifying not to his state of mind, but to a “New York 
State of Mind?” 
Mr. Joel’s ability to testify about the New York “State of 
Mind” would require that he be qualified as an “expert” on the New 
York State of Mind.  As an “expert” he could offer his opinion on 
what that state of mind was and describe his own reflections as fitting 
that exalted state.  To decide whether he is “an expert” in New York 
plunges the court into the nuances of the Frye doctrine in New York.  
In Frye v. United States,102 the court rejected the testimony of a de-
fense expert regarding the results of a “systolic blood pressure decep-
tion test” - an early type of polygraph test - because it had not yet 
“gained such standing and scientific recognition among physiological 
and psychological authorities.”103  Such recognition “would justify 
the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced from the discovery, 
development, and experiments made thus far made.”104  The Frye test 
turns on “acceptance by the relevant scientific community,” and the 
New York Court of Appeals has never “insisted that the particular 
procedure be ‘unanimously indorsed’” by scientists rather the evi-
dence must simply be “generally acceptable as reliable.”105  The 
 
99 BILLY JOEL, New York State of Mind, on TURNSTILES (Columbia Records 1976). 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), superseded by FED. R. EVID. 702, as recognized in 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
103 Frye, 293 F. at 1013. 
104 Id. 
105 Cornell v. 360 W. 51st St. Realty, LLC, 9 N.E.3d 884, 896-97 (N.Y. 2014). 
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Court of Appeals has said that a court may exclude the expert’s opin-
ion if “there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data 
and the opinion proffered.”106 
Importantly, the Court of Appeals in Cornell again rejected an 
attempt to engraft the Frye test’s main competitor - the standard set 
out by the United States Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,107– into New York law.  Daubert, which like 
Frye focuses on principles and methodology, calls upon a trial court 
to consider a nonexclusive list of four factors when assessing the evi-
dentiary reliability of “scientific evidence,” or, in this case, “expert 
musical evidence.” 
(1) whether the theory or technique about which the 
expert is testifying can be tested; 
(2) whether the object of the testimony “has been sub-
jected to peer review and publication”; 
(3) the known or potential error rate of the theory or 
technique; and 
(4) general acceptance in the relevant scientific com-
munity, which, although no longer the sole factor, 
“can yet have a bearing on the inquiry.”108 
When we compare these two roles and apply them to Mr. Jo-
el, Mr. Joel should be happy he is better than Bruce Springsteen - he 
was not just “Born in the USA,”109 he was born in New York, a Frye 
state and, under its jurisprudence, he’s more likely than not to be an 
expert on the “New York State of Mind.” 
Under the Frye rule, Mr. Joel can strut into “expert status.”  
His record sales, his Long Island roots, his knowledge of the Long Is-
land Sound - he may be “the expert” on both the musical “Long Is-
land Sound” and the “New York State of Mind.”  It is hard to fathom a 
more expert opinion on the New York State of Mind than Mr. Joel.  
In reaching this conclusion, any court would not need to hold that Mr. 
Joel is the only expert on the “New York State of Mind.”  There is 
some evidence that even a New Jersey native, properly tuned, can 
achieve “expert” status on issues involving the New York State of 
 
106 Id. at 897. 
107 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
108 Id. at 593-94. 
109 BRUCE SPRINGSTEEN, Born in the USA, on BORN IN THE USA (A&R Recordings, Inc. 
1977). 
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Mind, but most New Yorkers consider Hoboken’s hero - Francis Si-
natra - to be a “New York, New York” guy anyway.  New York has 
enough room to have two “experts” on the New York State of Mind. 
VII. “SHE’S ALWAYS A WOMAN” - REPUTATION EVIDENCE 
In his paean to women –and perhaps one woman, in particu-
lar– Mr. Joel rhapsodizes about this idyllic, in a 20th century sort of 
way, embodiment of femininity.110  “She may be frequently kind and 
she’s suddenly cruel” and “[s]he can do as she pleases, she’s no-
body’s fool,” but, in the end “she’s always a woman to me.”111  If he 
starts to chant these qualities in the courtroom, should a hearsay ob-
jection be sustained?  Can Mr. Joel testify to her character in this 
fashion? 
The answer lies in “reputation” or “character” evidence.  The 
Court of Appeals of New York has described “reputation” evidence 
as “the aggregate tenor of what others say or do not say about him is 
the raw material from which that character may be established.”112  
“A reputation may grow wherever an individual’s associations are of 
such quantity and quality as to permit someone to be personally ob-
served by a sufficient number of individuals to give reasonable assur-
ance of reliability.”113  “In short, the evidence must demonstrate a 
reputation rather than merely ‘individual and independent deal-
 
110 Daniel Hartley, John Lewis Ad: Analysis, WORDPRESS, https://thinkingblueguitars. 
wordpress.com/2010/04/30/john-lewis-ad-analysis/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2016). 
111 BILLY JOEL, She’s Always a Woman, on THE STRANGER (A&R Recordings, Inc. 1977). 
112 People v. Bouton, 405 N.E.2d 699, 703 (N.Y. 1980): 
The rule, however, is subject to a number of qualifications of which here 
relevant is the limitation that the reputation be specific to a particular 
community.  In the relatively immobile societal climate, in which the 
rule originally developed, the inhabitants of the geographical area in 
which a defendant resided were assumed to comprise the only communi-
ty in which the general opinion of him would be a reliable gauge of 
character.  However, the law has not been static in this regard.  In har-
mony with the dynamics of modern social organization, particularly the 
phenomenon of urbanization, it came to recognize that an individual may 
have multiple and varied bases around which a reputation might form.  
So, he might be better known in the community of his employment and 
in the circle of his vocational fellows, where opportunities to evidence 
the traits at stake may occur with greater frequency than in the environs 
of his dwelling place, nestled in the anonymity of a large city or suburb.  
Id. 
113 Id. at 704. 
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ings.’”114  Reputation evidence is most often utilized in criminal cases 
where “the proper method of proving character is by testimony of a 
defendant’s reputation in the community for the particular trait relat-
ing to and controverting the crime charged, such as honesty, veracity, 
peacefulness, or a law-abiding nature.”115  Conversely, a witness may 
testify that another witness “has a bad reputation in the community 
for truth and veracity.”116  The purpose of this provision is to allow a 
jury “a full picture of the witnesses presented . . . .”117 
In this case, Mr. Joel evokes a familiarity with this woman’s 
behavior among the general community - he knows that she can kill 
with a smile or wound with her eyes.  He makes it clear that he is not 
the woman’s only victim, after all, “she can take you or leave you” 
and “she’ll carelessly cut you and laugh while you’re bleeding.”  This 
woman’s reputation is based, in Mr. Joel’s mind, on his intimate as-
sociations with her and these connections are of such quantity and 
quality as to permit her character to be personally observed by a suf-
ficient number of individuals - including the heart-struck Mr. Joel - to 
give reasonable assurance of reliability to the declaration that “she’s 
always a woman to me.”118  Any listener would get the sense that all 
these facts constitute her reputation in a broad community - or at least 
in the infinite landscape of Mr. Joel’s imagination.  Stretching the 
rules to their limit, a court would admit this song in the trial. 
VIII. TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE OF MR. JOEL AS THE “LONG 
ISLAND SOUND” 
As a final exercise, one rule of evidence stands out.  In New 
York, “a court may take judicial notice of facts[,] which are capable 
of immediate and accurate determination by resort to easily accessi-
ble sources of indisputable accuracy.”119  To qualify for judicial no-
tice, the evidence must be a “matter[] of common knowledge within 
 
114 Id. 
115 Howard v. McGinnis, 632 F. Supp. 2d 253, 267 (W.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing People v. 
Berge, 478 N.Y.S.2d 433, 434 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1984)). 
116 People v. Fernandez, 950 N.E.2d 126, 130 (N.Y. 2011) (citing People v. Pavao, 451 
N.E.2d 216 (N.Y. 1983)). 
117 Id. at 131. 
118 BILLY JOEL, She’s Always a Woman, on THE STRANGER (A&R Recordings, Inc. 1977). 
119 Hamilton v. Miller, 15 N.E.3d 1199, 1204 (N.Y. 2014) (citing People v. Jones, 539 
N.E.2d 96 (N.Y. 1989)). 
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the court’s jurisdiction.”120  New York courts can take judicial notice 
of federal and foreign state law.121  Courts can take judicial notice of 
the sunrise,122 prior court orders,123 court records,124 actuarial tables 
showing life expectancy,125 court records in other proceedings,126 an 
incorrect address for a courthouse,127 the population of a city,128 regu-
lations of the Department of Housing and Urban Development,129 a 
date on the calendar,130 movement of the stock market:131 all of these 
facts are the subject of judicial notice.  Judicial notice has moved into 
the 21st century: a court can also take judicial notice of new technolo-
gies and websites.132  Google maps have also become the subject of 
judicial notice to plot distance and driving time.133  “Courts common-
 
120 People v. Watkins, 867 N.Y.S.2d 19, 20 Misc. 3d 1117 (A), at *4 n.1 (N.Y. City Crim. 
Ct. 2008). 
121 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4511(b) (McKinney 1962) (stating that “[e]very court may take 
judicial notice without request of . . . the laws of the foreign countries or their political sub-
divisions.”). 
122 People v. Schreier, 5 N.E.3d 985 at n.* (N.Y. 2014); See also People v. Bhagwandin, 
989 N.Y.S.2d 300 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2014) (holding that it was in “the court's discretion to 
decline to take judicial notice” of what constitutes “civil twilight”); compare Ceglia v. Zuck-
erberg, 2013 WL 1208558, at *49 (W.D.N.Y. 2013) (Courts can take judicial notice of day-
light savings time.). 
123 See Matter of Devon EE., 4 N.Y.S.3d 340, 341 n.1 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 2015) (denying 
motion to strike since the court “can take judicial notice of subsequent Family Court orders . 
. . .”). 
124 See Caudill v. Rochester Inst. of Tech., 125 A.D.3d 1392, 1393 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 
2015) (taking judicial notice of its own records when the court order was “not contained in 
the record on appeal,” but was submitted to the “court on earlier motions related to the ap-
peal . . . .”). 
125 See Vincent v. Landi, 998 N.Y.S.2d 495, 501 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 2014) (mentioning 
that the trial court took judicial notice of actuarial tables which indicated the plaintiff's life 
expectancy). 
126 See Monarch Consulting, Inc. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 993 N.Y.S.2d 
275, 287 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2014) (stating that in the state of New York appellate courts 
may take judicial notice of “official court records in other proceedings.”). 
127 See Segway of N.Y., Inc. v. Udit Group, Inc., 992 N.Y.S.2d 524, 527-28 (App. Div. 2d 
Dep’t 2014) (taking judicial notice of the incorrect address given in the notice of motion 
“was not merely a misspelling of the correct address . . . .”). 
128 See Matter of Vescera v. Stewart, 991 N.Y.S.2d 378, 379 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2014) 
(mentioning that judicial notice can be taken to “note of the fact that the population of” a city 
exceeds a certain number). 
129 See Owens v. Miesch, 987 N.Y.S.2d 780, 782 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2014) (holding that 
“the court properly took judicial notice of the applicable HUD regulations with respect to 
RHA's motion.”). 
130 See People v. Jarvis, 978 N.Y.S.2d 522, 525 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2014). 
131 See Marlinski v. Marlinski, 974 N.Y.S.2d 200, 205 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2013). 
132 See LaSonde v. Seabrook, 933 N.Y.S.2d 195, 199 n.8 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2011). 
133 See Carreiro v. Colbert, 5 N.Y.S.3d 327 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014). 
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ly use internet mapping tools to take judicial notice of distance and 
geography.”134 
While it has a new 21st century sheen, this ancient rule in New 
York is exemplified.  In Hunter v. N.Y., Ont. & W. R.R. Co.,135 the 
plaintiff was sitting on top of a freight car as it passed through the 
tunnel and the plaintiff struck the tunnel arch and, as a result, he was 
injured.136  The distance between the top of the car and the inside of 
the arch at the top was four feet and seven inches.137  The trial judge 
let the jury decide, “if the plaintiff was sitting down . . . whether his 
head would reach to that height.”138  The jury returned a plaintiff’s 
verdict.139  The Court of Appeals questioned “whether we will accept 
that finding . . . or whether we will take judicial notice of the height 
of the human body and the measurements of its separate parts, and . . 
. reverse a judgment that is based upon a finding clearly contrary to 
the laws of nature.”140  The court ordered a new trial, taking judicial 
notice that a man’s average height is less than six feet; and that dif-
ferences in height stem mainly from differences in leg length.141  
Therefore, the plaintiff could not have struck his forehead against the 
arch while sitting unless he was at least nine feet tall, a height for 
which there is no authenticated instance in human history.142  The 
court noted that while plaintiff may have been tall, and the jury may 
properly have acted upon its inspection of him, “a fact so rare in the 
course of nature should be made apparent in some way on the rec-
ord.”143 
If a court in New York can take judicial notice of almost eve-
ry undisputed fact - from the height of the average man to the time of 
the sunrise - any court would be well within its discretion to take ju-
dicial notice of another undisputed fact: Billy Joel is “a fact so rare in 
the course of nature:” the original 20th century New Yorker.  He is 
the voice of New York and his music brings New York’s panorama 
of people and places to the world. 
 
134 See Rindfleisch v. Gentiva Health Sys., Inc., 752 F. Supp. 2d 246, 259 n.13 (E.D.N.Y. 
2010). 
135 23 N.E. 9 (N.Y. 1889). 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 10. 
138 Id. 
139 Hunter, 23 N.E. at 10. 
140 Id. 
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Any objection to that ruling is overruled.  The verdict is final. 
 
Epilogue 
(Borrowed from the Bard from Stratford on Avon – Mid-
summer Night’s Dream) 
 
If this judge has offended, 
Think, but this, and all is mended – 
That you have but slumbered here 
While these cases, citations, and arguments did appear. 
And this weak and idle theme, 
No more yielding, but a dream, 
But, when the evidence is all tolled 
It celebrates the glory of Billy Joel. 
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